Biometric Training Data as M&A Liability: How to Price the Risk in Avatar Company Acquisitions
Biometric Training Data as M&A Liability:
How to Price the Risk in Avatar Company Acquisitions
The AI avatar model you are acquiring was trained on biometric data. Whether that data was lawfully collected, from whom, and under what consent framework determines whether the model is an asset or a contingent liability.
When a PE fund or strategic acquirer targets an AI avatar company, the core asset is the generative model — the system that synthesizes photorealistic faces, voice clones, and digital likenesses. What the model can do determines the valuation. But how the model was trained determines the liability.
Avatar models require vast quantities of biometric training data: face images, voice recordings, geometric landmark sequences, and body motion data. The sourcing of that data — from gig marketplaces, public internet scraping, proprietary collection, or synthetic generation — creates legal exposure that persists inside the trained model long after the original data is deleted. WCR Legal’s AI Avatar Due Diligence practice treats training data provenance as a primary DD workstream, not a compliance footnote.
Why Biometric Training Data Is Now an M&A Issue
Three legal mechanics transform biometric training data from a historical data governance question into an active deal liability. Each operates independently and can affect deal price even when the others are managed.
Gig marketplace contracts typically grant the commissioning platform a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide license to use the contributor’s biometric data for “any purpose.” This IP-law mechanism resolves copyright and intellectual property questions about the training data. It does not resolve BIPA. A gig worker who consented via a marketplace contract to the irrevocable commercial use of their face geometry did not, by that consent, provide BIPA-compliant written notice and release under 740 ILCS 14/15(b) if the contract lacks the required BIPA elements. The platform holds an IP license to data it collected without biometric privacy law compliance — a structurally contradictory position that many acquirers only discover post-close.
Unlike text training data, biometric data used to train a generative avatar model cannot be meaningfully anonymized post-training. The model’s generative capability is derived from the statistical encoding of real face geometries and voice patterns. Research in model inversion and membership inference attacks has demonstrated that biometric attributes of training data contributors can be extracted from trained models with varying degrees of fidelity. This means: deleting the training dataset does not delete the legal exposure. An acquirer who requests pre-close deletion of biometric training data as a remediation measure may reduce ongoing storage violations but retains a model that encodes the biometric attributes of unconsented contributors.
In an asset acquisition, the general rule is that buyers do not inherit seller liabilities. Biometric data liability is a significant exception. Courts applying BIPA have found that an acquirer who continues to use a trained model built on unlawfully collected biometric data is an active participant in the ongoing violation, not merely a passive successor. Under GDPR, the acquirer steps into the role of data controller for any biometric data that transfers with the asset — including the encoded attributes in the model. Structuring a transaction as an asset deal does not insulate the acquirer from biometric claims arising from the training dataset.
Risk by Training Data Source
Select the training data source that best describes the target platform’s model. Each profile carries a distinct risk classification and DD protocol. Most avatar platforms use multiple sources — apply the highest applicable risk profile.
CollectedLow Risk
MarketplaceMed–High
ScrapingHigh Risk
GeneratedLow Risk
Third-PartyMedium
The platform collected biometric training data directly from its own users through a product feature (e.g., users uploading their own face photos or voice recordings to create personal avatars). If proper BIPA and GDPR consent was obtained at the time of collection, and that consent covers training use, this is the lowest-risk sourcing profile. The primary DD question is whether the consent documentation is verifiable and whether it actually covers training as a stated purpose — not just avatar generation.
The platform sourced biometric training data from gig workers via a data labeling marketplace. Workers provided face images, voice recordings, or motion capture data under a marketplace contract. The marketplace granted the platform a commercial license to the data. The critical DD question: did the marketplace contract, or the platform’s own supplemental consent, satisfy BIPA Section 15(b) requirements for written notice and release for every Illinois-resident contributor? Most marketplace contracts from before 2023 did not. GDPR compliance depends on whether EU contributors were provided with explicit Art. 9 consent for special category data processing.
The platform trained its biometric model on publicly available images and videos scraped from the internet without individual consent. This is the training data methodology that generated the Clearview AI ($51.75M) and Meta ($650M) BIPA settlements. Public availability of a biometric image does not constitute consent under BIPA, GDPR, or copyright law. A scraping-sourced model carries simultaneous BIPA class action exposure, GDPR enforcement risk, and copyright infringement exposure under recent US and EU AI copyright rulings. This is the highest-risk profile and may constitute a deal-level issue for many acquirers.
The platform used synthetically generated biometric data (AI-generated faces and voices, not real people) to train or fine-tune its model. This is the lowest-risk sourcing profile from a biometric privacy perspective: no real individuals’ biometric identifiers were collected, so BIPA and GDPR biometric consent requirements do not directly apply. The primary DD questions shift to: (1) what model was used to generate the synthetic data, and was that model trained on real biometric data; (2) does the synthetic data generation method introduce copyright issues from the generative model used; and (3) are any real biometric samples in the training mix alongside the synthetic data.
The platform licensed biometric training data from a commercial data provider or research institution. The license agreement grants rights to use the dataset for training purposes. The risk profile depends on: (1) whether the original data provider collected biometrics with BIPA-compliant consent from all contributors; (2) whether the license survives a change of control; and (3) whether the data was collected before the provider implemented biometric compliance frameworks. Established academic datasets (e.g., LFW, VGGFace2) are particularly high-risk, as their original collection predates modern biometric privacy law and lacked adequate consent for commercial use.
How to Structure the Deal Around Biometric Liability
Biometric training data liability is quantifiable, and quantifiable liabilities can be priced. Four deal mechanisms address the exposure depending on its character, scale, and certainty. They are not mutually exclusive — most transactions with material exposure use two or three in combination.
Biometric Data DD Checklist
Six pre-close steps for M&A counsel reviewing an AI avatar company’s biometric training data. Run in parallel with general legal and technical DD during the data room phase.
Not reliably. The general asset purchase rule — that buyers do not assume seller liabilities — has been significantly eroded for biometric data claims. Courts applying BIPA have found that an acquirer who continues to deploy a trained model built on unlawfully collected biometric data is actively participating in the ongoing violation, not passively inheriting a past one. Under GDPR, the acquirer becomes the data controller for any biometric data that transfers with the asset. Additionally, plaintiffs’ counsel routinely name successor entities in class actions, and courts have shown willingness to allow those claims to proceed even in asset deals. An asset purchase structure reduces exposure at the margins but does not provide a complete liability shield.
No. Deletion of the raw training dataset addresses ongoing storage violations under BIPA Section 15(a) and GDPR Art. 5(1)(e) storage limitation. It does not eliminate claims for the historical period of unlawful collection or transmission. More importantly, the trained model encodes statistical representations of the biometric attributes of the training contributors. Research in model inversion demonstrates that these representations can be partially reconstructed. The model itself is, in a meaningful technical sense, derived from the biometric data of real individuals. Deploying the model post-close means deploying a product built on the contributors’ encoded biometric attributes — a fact that persists regardless of whether the underlying dataset is deleted.
Treat academic biometric datasets as equivalent to scraped internet data for M&A risk purposes. Datasets like LFW (Labeled Faces in the Wild), VGGFace2, and MS-Celeb-1M were assembled from public internet sources without individual consent, predate modern biometric privacy law, and have been the subject of removal requests and litigation by data subjects. MS-Celeb-1M was formally withdrawn by Microsoft following privacy concerns. Using any of these datasets in a commercial model’s training pipeline creates BIPA exposure for any Illinois-resident individuals whose images were included, and GDPR exposure for any EU-resident individuals. The commercial value of “pre-trained on a large public dataset” must be discounted against the inherited biometric liability from that dataset.
It depends entirely on the content of the specific contract and the jurisdiction of the gig worker. A marketplace contract that: (a) separately identifies biometric collection (distinct from general intellectual property assignment); (b) specifies the purpose of biometric use; (c) states a retention period; and (d) was signed before the first biometric capture event — may constitute a valid BIPA written release. Most marketplace contracts written before 2022 do not satisfy these requirements. The burden of proof in BIPA litigation is on the defendant to demonstrate that a compliant written consent was obtained. For M&A purposes, assume that gig marketplace contracts are deficient until a contract-by-contract review confirms otherwise.
Using a conservative Illinois demographic estimate (approximately 4% of US population is Illinois-resident), 50,000 total gig contributors yields approximately 2,000 potential Illinois-resident contributors. Under the SB 2909 aggregate model (one recovery per plaintiff): 2,000 claimants × $1,000–$5,000 = $2M–$10M exposure. Under the pre-amendment Cothron per-scan model (applicable to cases filed before the retroactivity question is resolved): if each contributor’s face geometry was scanned an average of 5 times during onboarding and data collection: 2,000 × 5 scans × $1,000–$5,000 = $10M–$50M exposure. For a $30M–$50M avatar company acquisition, this exposure range is material and should drive escrow sizing, price adjustment, and indemnification structure.
The Training Data Is the Liability.
WCR Legal audits biometric training data provenance, maps consent gaps across all sourcing channels, quantifies exposure under BIPA and GDPR, and recommends deal structure adjustments before you sign. Available for active M&A and investment transactions.


Post Comment